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1 Introduction
In competitive asset markets trading volume influences investors’ expecta-
tions of future asset returns, and thus, influences equilibrium asset prices.
The influence of trading externalities, such as trading volume on equilib-
rium asset prices, is brought about by a process of arbitrage elimination
that characterizes informationally efficient asset markets. While there have
been numerous papers investigating the connections between arbitrage and
equilibrium asset prices in asset market models with unbounded short sales,
with one exception there has been no work on the connections between arbi-
trage and asset prices in models with short sales where trading externalities
are taken into account.1
In this paper, we introduce a no-risky-arbitrage price condition, NRAP,
for models allowing both trading externalities and unbounded short sales,
and demonstrate that NRAP is sufficient, and in some cases necessary, for
the existence of competitive equilibrium in the presence of externalities.
In empirical studies of financial markets, available information may well
include both prices and volumes of net trades. Thus, it is important to
have characterizations depending on prices and observable data. In fact,
our research follows the fundamental work of Hammond (1983) for asset
market models and Werner (1987) for general equilibrium models.
In a risky arbitrage, an agent sells an existing portfolio and buys a utility
nondecreasing alternative portfolio for a net cost less than or equal to zero.
Whether a particular pair of transactions (selling a portfolio and buying an-
other) constitutes a risky arbitrage thus depends on the agent’s preferences
as well as asset prices and, in the presence of externalities, each agent’s pref-
erences in turn depend directly on the trades of other agents. In its most
potent form, a risky arbitrage is utility increasing and generates a net cost
less than or equal to zero.2 Here, we formalize the notion of risky arbitrage
in an asset market model with trading externalities and short sales and intro-
duce a condition on asset prices that rules out risky arbitrage for all agents.
Given the close connection between agent preferences and risky arbitrage,
NRAP is essentially an assumption concerning the degree of homogeneity in
1See Le Van, Page, and Wooders (2001).
2In a riskless arbitrage, an agent sells an existing portfolio and buys a replicating
portfolio (i.e., an alternative portfolio having the same returns in all states of nature) for
a net cost less than or equal to zero. Thus, a riskless arbitrage is a special case of a risky
arbitrage. In its most potent form, a riskless arbitrage generates a positive amount of
money upfront - or put differently, a riskless arbitrage can be carried out via a pair of
trades having a net cost strictly less than zero.
2
agents’ preferences.
The intuition behind our results is straightforward: with sufficient homo-
geneity, even if trading externalities are present and unbounded short sales
are allowed, if NRAP is satisfied an agent will be unable to carry out a risky
arbitrage because no one will be willing to take the other side of the trans-
action. However, with externalities, carrying out a transaction may perturb
the arbitrage opportunities for all agents and lead to further changes, even
reversing the desirability of the initial transaction. Such considerations make
formulation of NRAP delicate.
Besides being sufficient for existence of equilibrium, whenever all risky
arbitrages are utility increasing then NRAP is also necessary for existence
of equilibrium. Thus, in asset markets with externalities and short sales in
which all risky arbitrages are utility increasing, NRAP characterizes compet-
itive equilibrium. Moreover, for any given level of the externalities, NRAP
ensures existence of demand functions.
In the literature, no-risky-arbitrage (NRA) conditions for asset market
models without trading externalities fall into three broad categories: (i) con-
ditions on net trades, for example, Hart (1974), Page (1987), Nielsen (1989),
Page, Wooders, and Monteiro (2000), and Allouch (2002); (ii) conditions
on prices, for example, Grandmont (1970,1977), Green (1973), Hammond
(1983), and Werner (1987); (iii) conditions on the set of utility possibilities
(namely compactness), for example Brown and Werner (1995) and Dana, Le
Van, and Magnien (1999). In Le Van, Page, and Wooders (2001) an NRA
condition on net trades is introduced for models with trading externalities
and short sales - a condition that reduces to the condition of Hart (1974)
if no externalities are present - and it is shown that the net trades NRA
condition is sufficient for existence. Since NRAP reduces to the condition of
Werner (1987) if no externalities are present and enables proof of existence
of equilibrium in the presence of externalities, our research continues the
prior work. We further relate our condition to prior conditions by show-
ing that, if all risky arbitrages are utility increasing, then NRAP and the
NRA net trades condition are equivalent, and both characterize competitive
equilibrium.
In an economic model similar to the model presented here, but without
externalities, Dana, Le Van, and Magnien (1999) have shown that com-
pactness of the set of utility possibilities is sufficient for the existence of
competitive equilibrium. However, in the presence of externalities compact-
ness of utility possibilities, as a condition limiting arbitrage, is not sufficient
for existence.
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2 An Economy with Trading Externalities
Let (Xj , ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1 denote an unbounded exchange economy with trad-
ing externalities. In the economy (Xj , ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1 each agent j has choice
set Xj ⊂ R
L and endowment ωj ∈ Xj . The j
th agent’s preferences, defined
over X :=
∏n
j=1 Xj , are specified via a utility function uj(·, ·) : Xj ×X−j →
R, where X−j :=
∏
i6=j Xi. Note that for all agents j, X = Xj ×X−j . Let
x−j denote a typical element of X−j . Often it will useful to denote the
elements in X by (xj , x−j).
The set of rational allocations is given by
A = {(x1, ..., xn) ∈ X :
∑n
j=1 xj =
∑n
j=1 ωj
andforeachj, uj(xj , x−j) ≥ uj(ωj , x−j)}.
(1)
We will denote by A−j the projection of A onto X−j .
For each (xj , x−j) ∈
∏n
j=1 Xj , the preferred set is given by
Pj(xj , x−j) := {x ∈ Xj : uj(x, x−j) > uj(xj , x−j)}, (2)
while the weakly preferred set is given by
P̂j(xj , x−j) := {x ∈ Xj : uj(x, x−j) ≥ uj(xj , x−j)}. (3)
We will maintain the following assumptions on the economy (Xj , ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1:
For each j = 1, ..., n,
[A− 1]
{
Xjisclosedandconvex, andωj ∈ intXj ,
where“int” denotes“interior′′.
[A− 2]
{
Foreach(xj , x−j) ∈ X,uj(·, x−j)isquasi− concaveonXj ,
anduj(·, ·)iscontinuousonXj ×X−j .
[A− 3]
{
Foreach(xj , x−j) ∈ A, Pj(xj , x−j) 6= ∅,
andclPj(xj , x−j) = P̂j(xj , x−j).
Note that in [A-1] we do not assume that consumption sets, Xj , are bounded.
Also, note that given [A-2], for all (xj , x−j) ∈ X the preferred set Pj(xj , x−j)
is nonempty and convex, while the weakly preferred set P̂j(xj , x−j) is non-
empty, closed and convex. Finally, note that [A-3] implies that there is local
nonsatiation at rational allocations.
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Given prices p ∈ RL, the cost of a consumption vector x = (x1, ..., xL) is
〈p, x〉 =
∑L
ℓ=1 pℓ · xℓ. The budget set is given by
3
Bj(p, ωj) = {x ∈ Xj : 〈p, x〉 ≤ 〈p, ωj〉}. (4)
Without loss of generality we can assume that prices are contained in
the unit ball
B := {p ∈ RL : ‖p‖ ≤ 1}.
An equilibrium for the economy (Xj , ωj , uj(·))
n
j=1 is an (n + 1)-tuple of
vectors (x1, ..., xn, p) such that
(i) (x1, ..., xn) ∈ A (the allocation is feasible);
(ii) p ∈ B\{0} (prices are in the unit ball and not all prices are zero);
and
(iii) for each j,
(a) 〈p, xj〉 = 〈p, ωj〉 (budget constraints are satisfied), and
(b) xj ∈ Bj(p, ωj) and Pj(xj , x−j)∩Bj(p, ωj) = ∅ (i.e., xj maximizes
uj(xj , x−j) over Bj(p, ωj)).
We provide an example illustrating our model in application to an asset
market. This example will be further developed later in the paper.
Example: Part 1, An Asset Market with Trading Externalities.
Consider an agent j who seeks to form a portfolio xj = (x1j , . . . , xLj) of
L risky assets so as to maximize his expected utility given by
uj(xj , x−j) =
∫
RL
Uj(〈xj , r〉)dµj(r|x−j).
Here, xij denotes the number of (perfectly divisible) shares of asset i held
in the jth agent’s portfolio xj , and ri denotes the return on asset i, i.e., the
ith component of the asset return vector r ∈ RL+.
4 The inner product of the
portfolio vector xj and the asset return vector r, denoted by
〈xj , r〉 =
L∑
i=1
xijri,
3The restriction of the budget set to be a subset of the consumption set entails no losss
of substance or generality.
4RL+ denotes the nonnegative orthant of R
L. Thus, here we are assuming that all asset
returns are nonnegative or, equivalently, that all assets carry limited liability.
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gives the return generated by portfolio xj if the realized asset return vector
is r. Note that because short sales are allowed, 〈xj , r〉 can be negative. The
function
Uj(·) : R → R
is the jth agent’s utility function defined over end-of-period wealth. The
probability measure µj(·|x−j) defined over Borel subsets of asset returns
represents the jth agent’s subjective probability beliefs concerning end-of-
period asset returns conditioned by the (n− 1)-tuple, x−j , of portfolios held
by other agents.
Denote by S[µj(·|x−j)] the support of the conditional probability mea-
sure µj(·|x−j), and by K(x−j) the smallest convex cone containing S[µj(·|x−j)].
Finally, let K+(x−j) denote the positive dual cone of K(x−j), that is, let
K+(x−j) :=
{
y ∈ RL : 〈y, r〉 ≥ 0∀r ∈ K(x−j)
}
.
Note that any vector of net trades y contained in K+(x−j) generates a
nonnegative return with probability 1. Thus, trading in any direction y ∈
K+(x−j) is without downside risk.
Assume the following:
(a-1) For each agent j = 1, 2, . . . , n, the utility function Uj(·) : R → R is
concave and increasing.
(a-2) For each agent j = 1, 2, . . . , n, the mapping,
x−j → µj(·|x−j),
is continuous in the topology of weak (or narrow) convergence of prob-
ability measures.
(a-3) For all rational allocations (xj , x−j) ∈ A and for all agents j =
1, 2, . . . , n, S[µj(·|x−j)] ∩R
L
+\{0} 6= ∅.
(a-4) For all x−j ∈ X−j and for all agents j = 1, 2, . . . , n,
S[µj(·|x−j)] ⊆ C
for some bounded set C ⊂ RL+.
(a-5) For all agents j = 1, 2, . . . , n, the portfolio choice set Xj is closed
and convex with initial portfolio ωj ∈ intXj , and for all (xj,x−j) ∈ X,
y ∈ K+(x−j) implies that xj + y ∈ Xj .
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In words, assumption (a-3) means that at rational allocations each agent
believes that some asset will generate a positive return with a positive prob-
ability. Assumption (a-5) means that given any configuration of starting
portfolios (xj,x−j) ∈ X, agent j can alter (or rebalance) his starting port-
folio xj via net trades y ∈ K
+(x−j) (i.e., via a no-downside-risk portfolio)
without violating portfolio feasibility (i.e., without violating his constraint
set Xj). Note that together assumptions (a-1), (a-3), and (a-5) imply that
agents’ expected utility preferences satisfy assumption [A-3] (local nonsatia-
tion) while assumptions (a-1) and (a-2) imply that agents’ expected utility
preferences satisfy assumptions [A-2] (quasiconcavity and continuity).
3 Risky Arbitrage and NRAP
We begin by recalling a few basic facts about recession cones (see Section
8 in Rockafellar (1970)). Let X be a convex set in RL. The recession cone
0+(X) corresponding to X is given by
0+(X) = {y ∈ RL : x + λy ∈ X forallλ ≥ 0andx ∈ X}. (5)
If X is also closed, then the set 0+(X) is a closed convex cone containing
the origin. Moreover, if X is closed, then x + λy ∈ X for some x ∈ X and
all λ ≥ 0 implies that x′ + λy ∈ X for all x′ ∈ X and all λ ≥ 0. Thus, if X
is closed, then we can conclude that y ∈ 0+(X) if for some x ∈ X and all
λ ≥ 0, x + λy ∈ X.
(Risky Arbitrage):
A vector of net trades yj ∈ R
L is a risky arbitrage for agent j if there
exists a sequence{
xk
}
k
=
{
(xkj , x
k
−j)
}
k
=
{
(xk1, . . . , x
k
n)
}
k
⊂ X
such that
forallk, uj(x
k
j , x
k
−j) ≥ uj(ωj , x
k
−j),
and
yj = limk t
kxkj
forsomesequence
{
tk
}
k
ofpositiverealnumbers
suchthattk ↓ 0.
Denote by Rj the set of all risky arbitrages for agent j.
Let (xj , x−j) ∈ X satisfy xj ∈ P̂j(ωj , x−j). If yj ∈ 0
+P̂j(ωj , x−j), then yj
is a risky arbitrage. Thus, any vector of net trades contained in the recession
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cone of the weakly preferred set P̂j(ωj , x−j) is a risky arbitrage for agent j.
To see this, note that yj = limk t
kxkj with t
k = 1
k+1 and x
k
j = ωj + (k + 1)yj
and xkj ∈ P̂j(ωj , x−j) since yj ∈ O
+(P̂j(ωj , x−j)). We have then{
(xkj , x
k
−j)
}
k
= {(ωj + (k + 1)yj , x−j)}k ⊂ X,
and
yj = limk t
kxkj ,
wheretk ↓ 0,
andwhereforallk,
uj(x
k
j , x
k
−j) = uj(ωj + (k + 1)yj , x−j) ≥ uj(ωj , x−j).
Example: Part 2, Recession Cones and Risky Arbitrage.
Continuing our asset market example, let
sj(+) := limc→∞
dUj(c)
dc
and
sj(−) := limc→−∞
dUj(c)
dc
denote the asymptotic values of derivatives of the jth agent’s utility function
Uj(·) in the positive and negative directions respectively and add to our list
of assumptions the following assumption:
(a-6) for each agent j the ratio of the asymptotic derivatives sj := s
j(+)
sj(−)
is
zero.
The ratio sj is an asymptotic measure of risk tolerance. It inversely
measures the concavity of Uj(·) as c goes from −∞ to ∞. We adopt the
convention that sj = 0 when sj(−) = ∞. Note that under assumption (a-1)
(see Example, Part 1), 0 ≤ sj ≤ 1 for all agents j. If sj = 1 then the agent
is risk neutral and thus has the highest level of asymptotic risk tolerance. If
sj < 1 the agent is risk averse and therefore has a lower level of asymptotic
risk tolerance. In particular, if sj = 0 then the agent has the lowest level of
asymptotic risk tolerance. It is easy to verify that sj = 0 for all constant
absolute risk aversion utility functions.
By Lemma 5.2 in Page (1987), if sj = 0, then
O+(P̂j(ωj , x−j)) = K
+(x−j),
where, as in Example: Part 1, K+(x−j) is the positive dual cone of K(x−j).
5
5Recall that K(x−j) is the convex cone generated by the support S[µj(·|x−j)] of the
conditional probability measure µj(·|x−j).
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We now have our main result characterizing risky arbitrage.
(Characterization of Risky Arbitrage)
Let (Xj , ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1 be an economy with trading externalities satisfy-
ing assumptions [A-1]-[A-3]. The following statements are equivalent:
1. A vector of net trades yj ∈ R
L is a risky arbitrage for agent j.
2. There exists a sequence
{
(xkj , x
k
−j)
}
k
⊂ X such that
yj ∈ 0
+
(
lim P̂j(ωj , x
k
−j)
)
.
The limit, lim P̂j(ωj , x
k
−j), of the sequence of closed sets
{
P̂j(ωj , x
k
−j)
}
k
in part 2 of Theorem 1 is taken with respect to Painleve-Kuratowski con-
vergence (see, for example section B.II p. 15 in Hildenbrand (1974) for
definitions and properties). Before we prove Theorem 1, we provide the
following Lemma.
Let (Xj , ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1 be an economy with trading externalities satisfy-
ing assumptions [A-1]-[A-3]. Let
{
(xkj , x
k
−j)
}
k
⊂ X be a sequence such that
for all j and k, xkj ∈ P̂j(ωj , x
k
−j). Also let
{
tk
}
k
be a sequence of positive
real numbers with tk ↓ 0. If (y1, . . . , yn) is a cluster point of the sequence{
(tkxk1, . . . , t
kxkn)
}
k
, then there exists a subsequence
{
(tk
′
xk
′
1 , . . . , t
k′xk
′
n )
}
k′
such that for all j, yj ∈ 0
+
(
lim P̂j(ωj , x
k′
−j)
)
.
Proof: (Lemma 3) Without loss of generality, assume that
(y1, . . . , yn) = lim
k
(tkxk1, . . . , t
kxkn).
From Hildenbrand (1974), Proposition 1, p. 16, there exists a converging
subsequence
{(
P̂1(ω1, x
k′
−1), . . . , P̂n(ωn, x
k′
−n)
)}
k′
of
{(
P̂1(ω1, x
k
−1), . . . , P̂n(ωn, x
k
−n)
)}
k
.
Observe that for all j, lim P̂j(ωj , x
k′
−j) is convex (see Danzig, Folkman, and
Shapiro (1967), p. 521) and nonempty since it contains ωj . Also note that
(y1, . . . , yn) = limk′(t
k′xk
′
1 , . . . , t
k′xk
′
n ).
Now let x∗j ∈ lim P̂j(ωj , x
k′
−j) and let t be any positive number. By
the definition of lim P̂j(ωj , x
k′
−j), there exists a sequence
{
x∗k
′
j
}
k′
such that
x∗k
′
j → x
∗
j , as k
′ → ∞, and for all k′, x∗k
′
j ∈ P̂j(ωj , x
k′
−j). Since P̂j(ωj , x
k′
−j)
is convex for k′ large enough so that tk
′
t ≤ 1,
(1− tk
′
t)x∗k
′
j + t
k′txk
′
j ∈ P̂j(ωj , x
k′
−j).
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But
(1− tk
′
t)x∗k
′
j + t
k′txk
′
j → x
∗
j + tyj ∈ lim P̂j(ωj , x
k′
−j).
Thus, yj ∈ 0
+
(
lim P̂j(ωj , x
k′
−j)
)
.
Proof: (Theorem 3) (1) ⇒ (2). Let yj be a risky arbitrage for agent j
and let
{
(xkj , x
k
−j)
}
k
⊂ X be such that
forallk, uj(x
k
j , x
k
−j) ≥ uj(ωj , x
k
−j), and
yj = limk t
kxkj fort
k ↓ 0.
Then either
{∥∥∥xkj ∥∥∥}
k
is bounded and yj = 0 or
{∥∥∥xkj ∥∥∥}
k
is unbounded and
from the Lemma, yj ∈ 0
+
(
lim P̂j(ωj , x
k′
−j)
)
for some subsequence
{
(xk
′
j , x
k′
−j)
}
k′
.
(2) ⇒ (1). Conversely, let yj ∈ 0
+
(
lim P̂j(ωj , x
k
−j)
)
for some sequence{
(xkj , x
k
−j)
}
k
⊂ X.
Let {λm}m be a sequence of real numbers such that λ
m ↑ ∞. Since
yj ∈ 0
+
(
lim P̂j(ωj , x
k
−j)
)
,
we have ωj + λ
m yj ∈ lim P̂j(ωj , x
k
−j) for all m. Let ε > 0. For each m there
exists km and x
km
j ∈ P̂j(ωj , x
km
−j ) such that∥∥∥ωj + λmyj − xkmj ∥∥∥ < ε.
This implies that ∥∥∥∥ ωjλm + yj − xkmjλm
∥∥∥∥ < ελm .
Letting m → ∞, we conclude that
x
km
j
λm
→ yj . Because x
km
j ∈ P̂j(ωj , x
km
−j )
for all m and because 1
λm
→ 0, yj is a risky arbitrage for agent j.
(Closedness of the set of Risky Arbitrages)
Let (Xj , ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1 be an economy with trading externalities sat-
isfying assumptions [A-1]-[A-3]. Then, for each agent j, the set of risky
arbitrages, Rj , is closed.
Proof: Let {yν}ν ⊂ Rj be a sequence of arbitrages for the jth agent
such that
yν → y.
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We want to show that y ∈ Rj . By our characterization of risky arbi-
trage, we have for each ν, a sequence
{
(xk,νj , x
k,ν
−j )
}
k
⊂ X such that yν ∈
0+
(
limk P̂j(ωj , x
k,ν
−j )
)
. Let ε > 0 and let {λm}m be a sequence of real num-
bers such that λm ↑ ∞. For all m and ν there exists a positive integer k(m, ν)
such that
(i)
∥∥∥ωj + λmyν − xk(m,ν),νj ∥∥∥ ≤ ε
and
(ii)x
k(m,ν),ν
j ∈ P̂j(ωj , x
k(m,ν),ν
−j ).
From (i) it follows that ∥∥∥∥∥ ωjλm + yν − xk(m,ν),νj λm
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ ελm .
Therefore, ∥∥∥∥∥xk(m,ν),νj λm
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ ελm + ∥∥∥ ωjλm ∥∥∥ + ‖yν‖ ,
and hence
{
x
k(m,ν),ν
j
λm
}
(m,ν)
is bounded. In particular, the sequence
{
x
k(n,n),n
j
λn
}
n
is bounded. Let zj be a cluster point of this sequence. Then zj is a risky
arbitrage and zj = y.
(The No-Risky-Arbitrage Price Condition, NRAP):
(1) p ∈ RL is a NRAP price for agent j if 〈p, yj〉 > 0 for all nonzero risky
arbitrages yj ∈ Rj\{0}.
(2) Let Sj denote the jth agent’s set of NRAP prices. The economy
(Xj , ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1 with trading externalities satisfies NRAP if
∩jSj 6= ∅.
Note that the set of NRAP prices Sj is a convex cone. More impor-
tantly, note that any price vector p ∈ ∩jSj assigns a positive value to the
risky arbitrages of any agent. Thus, if p is a no-risky-arbitrage price, then
each agent’s demand correspondence is nonempty at p no matter what con-
sumption vectors are chosen by other agents (see section 6 below on viable
prices, and in particular, see part 1 of Theorem 6.1).
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If there exists a pointed closed convex cone C ⊂ RL such that each
agent’s set of risky arbitrages, Rj , is contained in C, then NRAP is sat-
isfied.6 In particular, by classical separation arguments, for C a pointed
closed convex cone there exists a nonzero vector p ∈ RL such that 〈p, y〉 > 0
for all nonzero y ∈ C - and thus, 〈p, yj〉 > 0 for all nonzero risky arbitrages
yj ∈ Rj . Conversely, since the risky arbitrage sets, Rj , are cones, if NRAP
is satisfied then given prices p contained in ∩jSj , there exists α > 0 such
that for all j, Rj is contained in the pointed convex cone C given by
C =
{
y ∈ RL : 〈p, y〉 > α ‖y‖
}
.
Example: Part 3, The Existence of a Closed Pointed Cone Con-
taining All Risky Arbitrages.
Assume that
(a-7) each agent j has conditional probability beliefs, µj(·|x−j), concerning
asset returns such that for some closed convex cone, Kj , with non-
empty interior
Kj = K(x−j)forall(xj , x−j) ∈ X,
where again K(x−j) is the convex cone generated by the support
S[µj(·|x−j)] of µj(·|x−j).
It is important to note that the invariance of the cones K(x−j) with
respect to x−j (i.e., with respect to the trades of other agents) does not
imply that conditional probability beliefs are invariant with respect to x−j .
Moreover, nonemptiness of the interior of Kj implies that no asset returns
are perfectly correlated.
In light of Example: Part 2, we can conclude that if assumptions (a-1)-
(a-6) are satisfied and if assumption (a-7) holds, then for all (xj , x−j) ∈ X
O+(P̂j(ωj , x−j)) = K
+
j ,
where K+j is the positive dual cone of Kj . Moreover, under (a-1)-(a-7), for
each agent j the set of risky arbitrages Rj is equal to K
+
j .
By Proposition 3 in Page (1996), the jth agent’s set of NRAP prices, Sj ,
is equal to the interior of Kj (denoted intKj), and thus, NRAP is satisfied
if and only if
∩jintKj 6= ∅
6Some authors take ”pointed” to mean only that the cone contains the origin. We
take a pointed cone to be one which contains the origin and does not contain a line.
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(i.e., a price vector p is a vector of no-risky-arbitrage prices if and only if
p ∈ ∩jintKj). Finally, by Proposition 5 in Page (1996), under assumptions
(a-1)-(a-7), ∩jintKj 6= ∅ if and only if
n∑
j=1
yj = 0withyj ∈ Rjforalljimpliesthatyj = 0forallj.(∗)
Under (a-1)-(a-7) it is easy to show that condition (*), the no-mutually-
compatible-arbitrages condition, holds if and only if there is a pointed closed
convex cone C ⊂ RL such that each agent’s set of risky arbitrages, Rj , is
contained in C.
One of the main implications of NRAP is compactness of the set of
rational allocations. This implication is a key ingredient in our proof of
existence of a competitive equilibrium.
(NRAP implies compactness of rational allocations):
Let (Xj , ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1 be an economy with trading externalities satisfy-
ing assumptions [A-1]-[A-3]. If the economy satisfies NRAP then the set of
rational allocations, A, is compact.
Proof: Since A is closed, we have just to prove that A is bounded.
Suppose not. Then there is a sequence
{
(xk1, . . . , x
k
n)
}
k
⊂ A such that∑
j
∥∥∥xkj ∥∥∥ → ∞ as k → ∞. Letting tk := 1∑
j
‖xkj‖
, we have for some subse-
quence
{
(xk
′
1 , . . . , x
k′
n )
}
k′
,
(tk
′
xk
′
1 , . . . , t
k′xk
′
n ) → (y1, . . . , yn)
with∑
j ‖yj‖ = 1.
We have (y1, . . . , yn) 6= 0 and by definition, (y1, . . . , yn) is a risky arbitrage.
By NRAP, there exists a price vector p ∈ ∩jSj such that
〈p, yj〉 > 0forj = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Thus, ∑
j
〈p, yj〉 =
〈
p,
∑
j
yj
〉
> 0.
But now we have a contradiction because∑
j t
k
′
xk
′
j =
∑
j t
k
′
ωjforallk
andtherefore∑
j t
k
′
xk
′
j →
∑
j yj = 0.
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4 Existence of Equilibrium
4.1 Existence for Bounded Economies with Externalities
We begin by defining a k-bounded economy,
(Xkj , ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1, (6)
In the k-bounded economy, the jth agent’s consumption set is
Xkj := Xj ∩Bk(ωj), (7)
where Bk(ωj) is a closed ball of radius k centered at the agent’s endowment,
ωj .
Define
Xk :=
n∏
j=1
Xkj .
The set of k-bounded rational allocations is given by
Ak = {(x1, ..., xn) ∈ Xk :
∑n
j=1 xj =
∑n
j=1 ωj
andforeachj, uj(xj , x−j) ≥ uj(ωj , x−j)}.
(8)
By Theorem 3.6 above, if the original economy (Xj , ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1 sat-
isfies NRAP, then the set of rational allocations is compact. Thus, there
exists some integer k∗ such that for all k ≥ k∗, Ak = A.
An equilibrium for the k-bounded economy, (Xkj , ωj , uj(·))
n
j=1, is an (n+
1)-tuple of vectors (xk1, . . . , x
k
n, p
k) such that
(i) (xk1, . . . , x
k
n) ∈ Ak, (the allocation is feasible);
(ii) pk ∈ B\{0} (prices are in the unit ball and not all prices are zero);
and
(iii) for each j,
(a)
〈
pk, xkj
〉
=
〈
pk, ωj
〉
(budget constraints are satisfied), and
(b) xkj ∈ Bkj(p
k, ωj) and Pkj(x
k
j , x
k
−j) ∩ Bkj(p
k, ωj) = ∅ (i.e., x
k
j
maximizes uj(xj , x
k
−j) over Bkj(p
k, ωj)).
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Here,
Pkj(x
k
j , x
k
−j) := Pj(x
k
j , x
k
−j) ∩Xkj ,
and
Bkj(p
k, ωj) := Bj(p
k, ωj) ∩Xkj .
We now have our main existence result for bounded economies.
(Existence of an equilibrium for k-bounded economies)
Let (Xj , ωj , uj(·))
n
j=1 be an economy with trading externalities satisfying
assumptions [A-1]-[A-3] and let k∗ satisfy the condition that Ak∗ = A. Then
for all k ≥ k∗ the k-bounded economy,
(Xjk, ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1,
has an equilibrium, (xk1, . . . , x
k
n, p
k), with
pk ∈ Bu :=
{
p ∈ RL : ‖p‖ = 1
}
.
Proof: Because the original economy (Xj , ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1 satisfies lo-
cal nonsatiation at rational allocations (i.e., assumption [A-3]), for all k
larger than k∗ such that Ak = A for k ≥ k
∗, the k-bounded economy
(Xjk, ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1 also satisfies local nonsatiation at rational allocations.
Thus it follows from Florenzano (2003), chapter 2, that for k larger than k∗,
the k-bounded economy (Xjk, ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1 has an equilibrium.
4.2 Existence for Unbounded Economies with Externalities
Our main existence result for unbounded economies with externalities is the
following:
(Existence for unbounded economies with externalities)
Let (Xj , ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1 be an economy with trading externalities sat-
isfying assumptions [A-1]-[A-3]. If the economy satisfies NRAP, then the
economy has an equilibrium, (x1, . . . , xn, p), with
p ∈ Bu :=
{
p ∈ RL : ‖p‖ = 1
}
.
.
Proof: For each k larger than k∗ such that Ak = A for k ≥ k
∗, the
k-bounded economy (Xjk, ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1 has an equilibrium
(xk1, . . . , x
k
n, p
k) = (xk, pk) ∈ Ak × Bu = A× Bu.
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Since A× Bu is compact, we can assume without loss of generality that
(xk1, . . . , x
k
n, p
k) → (x1, . . . , xn, p) ∈ A× Bu.
Moreover, since for all j and k,
〈
pk, xkj
〉
=
〈
pk, ωj
〉
, we have for all j,
〈p, xj〉 = 〈p, ωj〉 .
Let uj(xj , x−j) > uj(xj , x−j). Then, for k > k
∗ sufficiently large, xj ∈
Xjk and uj(xj , x
k
−j) > uj(x
k
j , x
k
−j) which implies that
〈
pk, xj
〉
>
〈
pk, ωj
〉
.
Thus, in the limit 〈p, xj〉 ≥ 〈p, ωj〉 . Hence, (x1, . . . , xn, p) is a quasi-equilibrium.
Since for all j, ωj ∈ intXj (see [A-1]) and since utility functions are contin-
uous (see [A-2]), in fact, (x1, . . . , xn, p) is an equilibrium.
5 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Exis-
tence
We begin by introducing the following uniformity conditions:
[A− 4]
{
Ifyj ∈ Rj\ {0} , then
forall(xj , x−j) ∈ A, uj(xj + yj , x−j) > uj(xj , x−j).
By assumption [A-4] all risky arbitrages are utility increasing provided that
the starting point for the risky arbitrage is a rational allocation.
Now we have our main result on necessary and sufficient conditions for
existence.
(NRAP ⇔ existence of equilibrium)
Let (Xj , ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1 be an economy with trading externalities satisfy-
ing assumptions [A-1]-[A-4]. Then the following statements are equivalent:
1. (Xj , ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1 satisfies NRAP.
2. (Xj , ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1 has an equilibrium.
Proof: By Theorem 4.2, we know that (1) ⇒ (2). So we need only
establish that (2) ⇒ (1). Let (x, p) be an equilibrium and for some agent j
suppose that yj ∈ Rj\ {0} is a risky arbitrage. By [A-4], uj(xj + yj , x−j) >
uj(xj , x−j). Because (x, p) is an equilibrium 〈p, xj + yj〉 > 〈p, ωj〉 = 〈p, xj〉 .
Thus, 〈p, yj〉 > 0.
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6 Viable Prices and Externalities
In this section we extend Kreps’ (1981) notion of viable prices to exchange
economies with externalities and establish the relationship between NRAP
and viable prices. To begin, consider the problem
max
{
uj(xj , x−j) : xj ∈ P̂j(ωj , x−j)and 〈p, xj〉 ≤ 〈p, ωj〉
}
,
where x−j ∈ X−j is given. We say that price vector p is viable for agent
j if this problem has a solution for any x−j ∈ X−j . Thus, p is viable for
agent j if agent j′s demand correspondence is nonempty at p no matter
what consumption vector x−j ∈ X−j is chosen by other agents. Consider
now the following strengthening of assumption [A-4],
[A− 4]∗
{
Ifyj ∈ Rj\ {0} , then
forall(xj , x−j) ∈ X,uj(xj + yj , x−j) > uj(xj , x−j).
By assumption [A-4]∗ all risky arbitrages are utility increasing starting at
any (xj , x−j) ∈ X.
(NRAP and viable prices)
Let (Xj , ωj , uj(·, ·))
n
j=1 be an economy with trading externalities satisfy-
ing assumptions [A-1]-[A-3]. Then the following statements are true:
1. If p is an NRAP price for agent j, then p is viable for agent j.
2. If assumption [A-4]∗ also holds, then if p is viable for agent j, then p
is an NRAP price for agent j.
Proof: (1) Since uj(·, ·) is continuous, it suffices to prove that the set{
x ∈ RL : x ∈ P̂j(ωj , x−j)and 〈p, x〉 ≤ 〈p, ωj〉
}
is bounded. If not, let
{
xk
}
k
be an unbounded sequence which satisfies
xk ∈ P̂j(ωj , x−j)
and〈
p, xk
〉
≤ 〈p, ωj〉 forallk.
Let y be a cluster point of the sequence
{
xk
‖xk‖
}
k
. Then y is a risky arbitrage
and 〈p, y〉 ≤ 0, a contradiction since p is an NRA price vector for agent j.
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(2) Conversely, let p be viable and assume [A-4]∗ holds. Let x solve the
problem
max
{
uj(xj , x−j) : xj ∈ P̂j(ωj , x−j)and 〈p, xj〉 ≤ 〈p, ωj〉
}
,
and suppose y 6= 0 is a risky arbitrage. By [A-4]∗
uj(x + y, x−j) > uj(x, x−j).
We have
〈p, ωj + y〉 ≥ 〈p, x + y〉
and
〈p, x + y〉 > 〈p, ωj〉 implies 〈p, y〉 > 0.
By Theorem 6.1, if the economy satisfies [A-1]-[A-3] then the NRAP
condition guarantees the existence of a nonempty set of viable prices for
the economy (i.e., for all agents), and thus, guarantees the existence of
demand functions over the set of viable prices. In addition, by Theorem
6.1, if all risky arbitrages are utility increasing starting at any (xj , x−j) ∈ X
(i.e., if [A-4]∗ holds), then the existence of demand functions guarantees the
existence no-risky-arbitrage prices.
Example: Part 4, The Uniformity Conditions [A-4] and [A-4]*:
Under assumptions (a-1)-(a-7), it follows from Lemma 3 in Page (1996)
that each risky arbitrage yj ∈ Rj\{0} is such that
uj(xj + yj , x−j) > uj(xj , x−j)forall(xj , x−j) ∈ X.
Thus, in our asset market example, if assumptions (a-1)-(a-7) hold, then all
risky arbitrages yj ∈ Rj\{0} are utility increasing starting at any (xj , x−j) ∈
X (i.e., the uniformity assumption [A-4]* holds - and thus [A-4] holds as
well).
7 Conclusions
Externalities are a pervasive feature of economics and, not surprisingly, the
subject of ongoing interest in general equilibrium models (see, for example,
Florenzano (2003), Bonnisseau (1997), Bonnisseau and Me´decin (2001)).
Our research contributes to this for a class of models which we feel is of
interest and importance – situations where agents may be affected by both
prices and trading volume, an indicator of what other agents are doing. Our
condition, NRAP forges a link between trading volume and asset prices in
markets where arbitrage is possible.
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